

## THOUGHTS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

*There is a lot of guessing going on about the future of Moscow's foreign policy. We do not profess to know what it will be like. But we do not think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from its former course. Conditions have changed too much. It is toward the present ways and methods of Soviet foreign policy that we must look for indications of its possible future trends.*

### THE COMMUNIST PARTIES ABROAD

**W**HAT are the forces abroad on which Soviet foreign policy can depend? At first sight, most people might be inclined to answer: on the Communist parties, of course. And some might go so far as to predict that Bolshevism will re-emphasize the identity of the Communist movement throughout the world and perhaps even revive the Communist International. But so far there have been no indications of that kind. This is only natural. For the Comintern was a symbol of the world-wide validity of the Communist ideology, of the equal quality of all peoples or at least of their working classes. It was an expression of the faith in a kindred and uniform evolution everywhere in the world. All this is no longer compatible with the new Bolshevik ideology of a Land of Promise, according to which the Soviet Union has been predestined to save mankind.

When Bolshevism was still in its infancy, when the minds of the Party men were still filled with the international phraseology of the early Marxists, Moscow was chosen as the seat of the Comintern. But as the Bolsheviks grew in strength and self-assurance, as they became more and more permeated with the idea of the uniqueness of the Soviet Union, they gradually lost interest in the Comintern, until they finally liquidated it entirely two years ago.

In "Stalin the Historian" (October 1944) we discussed the Bolsheviks' efforts to prove the unique position of the Soviet Union in the field of history. Similar endeavors are to be observed in the field of political theory as well. Here are four examples.

#### (I) SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The main point of controversy between Stalin and Trotsky was whether socialism was to be achieved in one country, viz., the Soviet Union alone, or only on a world-wide scale after World Revolution had been accomplished. In support of his thesis that socialism was possible in one country only, Stalin's followers cited Marx (Trotsky did the same to support his own thesis) and attempted to prove a straight line from Marx via Lenin to Stalin. In the most recent issues of the leading Party

periodicals *Bolshevik* and *Propagandist*, however a different notion is provided:

With the courage characteristic of a true scientific master-mind, Lenin replaced the old, obsolete theses and conclusions of Marxism with new theses and conclusions accruing from the new historical situation. . . . In their study of preimperialistic capitalism, Marx and Engels concluded that the socialist revolution cannot be victorious in one country alone, that it can only be victorious in all or the majority of the civilized countries. . . . Lenin was the first to realize that the old formula of Marx and Engels no longer corresponds to the new historical situation. On the basis of his study of the course of capitalism's evolution in the epoch of imperialism, Lenin arrived at the scientific conclusion of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one particular country and the impossibility of the simultaneous victory of socialism in all countries. (*Bolshevik*, No. 1, 1945, pp.3, 4)

These words represent the discarding of the former argumentation according to which the Soviet Union was the manifestation of universal Marxist laws. Instead, it is now claimed that it owes its existence to the fact that a Russian—Lenin—replaced the internationally valid law of Marx by one applicable to the Soviet Union in particular and then turned this particular law into an internationally valid one.

Stalin's thesis of socialism in one country has for almost twenty years been an undisputed credo in the Soviet Union. If it is suddenly being emphasized again, this is only to be explained by foreign-political developments which have made it necessary to support the thesis of a special position of the USSR and the Soviet Bolsheviks.

#### (II) THE SOVIETS

We find a similar repudiation of the Communism of Marx and Engels by the Bolsheviks with regard to the question of form of government. Engels, Marx's closest collaborator, taught in 1891 in his *Criticism of the Erfurt Program*:

Our Party and the working classes can only seize power under a political form such as the democratic republic. The latter is indeed the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

One could hardly put it more definitely. But the latest issue of *Bolshevik* informs us:

While the Marxists of all countries were of the opinion that the parliamentary-democratic republic represented the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . Lenin, having studied the ex-

periences of two revolutions in Russia, arrived at the conclusion that the best political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat was not the parliamentary-democratic republic but the Soviet republic. (*Bolshevik*, No. 1, 1945, pp. 5, 6)

That he meant this not only for Russia but also for the rest of the world is underlined by *Bolshevik*. (No. 1, 1944, p. 5)

With great relish, *Bolshevik* describes how horrified many Marxists were at the time at Lenin's overthrowing of the Marx-Engels doctrine; how Plekhanov believed that Lenin must be speaking in a delirium, how others thought that Lenin had gone mad. The periodical continues:

What would have become of the Party, of our Revolution, of Marxism, if Lenin had been afraid of the letter of Marxism and not decided to replace an old doctrine of Marxism as formulated by Engels by the new thesis of the Soviet republic, which corresponded to the new historical situation? The Party would be wandering about in the dark, the councils [soviets] would be disorganized, we would have no Soviet power, and the Marxist theory would have suffered a serious defeat. (*Bolshevik*, No. 1, 1945, p. 44)

All those who have studied the history of Bolshevism are well aware of the fact that Lenin supported and applied the idea of the Soviet state. But up to most recent times, indeed, really up to the publication of this issue of *Bolshevik*, the Bolshevik theoreticians always made out Marx and Engels to have been the real fathers of this theory, even though they had not developed it to any extent. Hence it is new and indicative that *Bolshevik* represents Lenin's action not—as had always been done before—as a continuation of, but a breaking with the Marx-Engels doctrine, unmasking one of the fundamental theories of the fathers of the Communist movement as a serious error.

This theoretical move is important for two reasons: (1) the allies and friends of the Soviet Union abroad should turn their attention to the fact that the Bolsheviks are already speaking so emphatically of the superiority of the Soviet state over a parliamentary-democratic state; (2) the new argumentation serves to point out the uniqueness of the Soviet Union and the difference between Soviet Bolshevism and international Marxism, to represent Bolshevism as the only true form of Communism, and to explain why the Bolsheviks are free in their actions, why they need not take advice from or justify their actions to anyone. As Stalin once put it:

In its activity [the Party] relies not on quotations and utterances but on practical experience, judging each step by past experience.

In other words, in addition to being aware of the special characteristics which separate them from other human beings, the Bolsheviks in the USSR no longer believe that the Marxist laws of history would objectively substantiate their own rule. On the contrary, they are of the opinion that everything depends on whether

they themselves are clever and bold enough to develop to their own advantage the circumstances which brought them into power.

### (III) THE STATE

The third essential point in which Bolshevism differs from Marxism according to the most recent interpretation is that—in contrast to the doctrine of Marx, who felt hostile toward the state—the state is not condemned to extinction:

Comrade Stalin has given scientific reasons for the necessity of further strengthening the state. (*Propagandist*, No. 1, 1945, p. 15)

This emphasis on the state also deserves serious attention from the Soviet Union's allies who, after all, allegedly went to war to destroy the totalitarian state. The Bolsheviks no longer speak of the extinction of the state even in the remote future. They have lost interest in a Communist stateless society, as its establishment would mean the disintegration of the Soviet state, whose existence the Bolsheviks regard as the main instrument of their world politics.

Of course, the Bolsheviks endorse only their own state. Not only are they hostile to the capitalist or Fascist state, they will also tell themselves that the establishment of new Communist states independent of Moscow would entail serious problems. If, in spite of years of effort, they have not succeeded in fundamentally changing human nature in their own country, they can hardly reckon on the Communists of Germany, France, or England bringing about such a change there. In that case, however, the Communists of those countries will not be able to do without the weapon of the all-powerful state, any more than can the Bolsheviks in the USSR. This in turn entails the danger that there, too, a similar amalgamation between the original Communism and the conditions, forces, and desires of the country in question takes place and produces an independent life which may one day cease to correspond to the plans of Moscow. For every state develops its own interests.

As for Communist parties, in Moscow's eyes they may and should exist, if possible in every nation, and each of them should be an organization of people of a fundamentally identical trend of mind. But all of them must be led, and only the Bolshevik Party of the USSR is able to do so. For, in the eyes of its followers, Bolshevism is not just any one of the various forms of Communism but by far the best form, representing as it does Communism as such. This explains the paradox so often repeated by the Bolsheviks, that the patriots of the Soviet Union are at the same time praised as internationalists. In their eyes, the Soviet Union is the true Communist International.

A patriotic internationalist is he whose entire conscious activity arises from the knowledge that the great October Revolution in the USSR is part, begin-

ning, and foundation of the proletarian World Revolution. (*Sputnik Agitatora*, No. 24, 1940, p. 26)

#### (IV) "SOVINTERN"

In a fourth respect, too, the Soviet Union occupies a special position. In Moscow's opinion, it is inhabited by peoples in comparison to whom many of the peoples living outside of the Soviet Union are small and insignificant.

With regard, for instance, to the level of material and spiritual culture, can one compare our sunny Soviet Georgia with a Hungary, or our flourishing Uzbekistan with a miserable Rumania? . . . The Soviet Ukraine is, from the point of view of territory, population, industrial development, agricultural importance, and national Soviet culture, one of the greatest and leading countries of Europe. . . . In the development of human culture and civilization the Soviet Ukraine is at present playing a leading part, far more leading than many countries of Western Europe. (*Pod Znamenem Marksizma*, No. 11, 1943, pp. 25, 27)

And we must add: if that is the case with a people of the Caucasus, Central Asia, or the Ukraine, who could hope to stand a comparison with the Russian people?

An attitude such as this no longer permits any idea of equality among the Communist parties. Co-operation between the Bolsheviks and the Communist parties abroad can hence no longer be conceived within the framework of a Communist International but only in such a way that, as in the case of Georgia and Uzbekistan, all countries controlled by Communists sovietize their culture and subordinate their policy to the Soviet Union. The goal aimed at by Moscow today is no longer the Comintern but the Bolshevik-Soviet International, the "Sovintern."

All this does not, of course, mean that Moscow has given up its interest in the Communist parties abroad. They still are important means for the achievement of its ends. Another reason why Moscow must still make use of them is that the USSR does not possess a sufficient number of men with the necessary training in politics, languages, etc., to take over the running of other countries. Nevertheless, it is interesting that during the last few years, particularly during the period when the greater part of Europe was under German control, there was in Soviet publications very little mention of Communist parties abroad, and that this was only changed when various countries began to fall, directly or indirectly, under the control of the Red Army. The Bolsheviks only desire a revival of Communist parties abroad when the latter can be permeated by Soviet Bolsheviks. And when one knows how farsighted the Bolsheviks are in the ideological preparation of their course and measures, one can hardly go wrong in recognizing the above four arguments as hints intended to put the foreign Communist parties in their place.

#### THE GERMAN ISSUE

The problematic nature of the future Bol-

shevist foreign policy and of Moscow's attitude to the Communist parties abroad becomes still clearer when we reflect how the Kremlin imagines the treatment of the German question.

Moscow has found out how difficult it is to Bolshevize even the Ukrainians, who have lived under Russian rule for many centuries, or the tiny Baltic States, which, except for the years 1917/40 and 1941/44, have belonged to the Russian empire since the eighteenth century. In 1940, when the Baltic States were occupied by the Red Army, the world was informed that with infinitesimal exceptions the Baltic peoples had enthusiastically welcomed their inclusion in the USSR. But now that the Soviets have recaptured these peoples after three years of German control, the Soviet press tells us of the resistance offered by the Baltic peoples to Bolshevization. As a result of the national questions broached by the war and the German occupation, the national question as such has become acute in the Soviet Union.

In view of the complications arising from the mere existence of a Bolshevik Kazakhstan and the inclusion of an Estonia, the Bolsheviks must ask themselves what the consequences will be for them if, in one form or another, they come to control the largest European nation, Germany. Will not the German Communists—who have a far older Marxist tradition than the Russians—once they are in control of Germany, begin to give advice to Moscow? Would a strong Communist party in Germany really be of advantage to the Bolsheviks?

There are two symptoms to indicate Moscow's future treatment of the German question.

(1) Just as Moscow does not recognize the Turko-Tartar inhabitants of the USSR as a unit but insists on dividing them into Bashkirs, Tartars, Kazakhs, etc., to prevent the forming of a bloc, so would it like to split up the German people. Hence the endeavor to regard the "Austrian" as a human type apart from the Germans, in the same category with the Hungarian or Rumanian. Indeed, the Soviets have now even discovered the "Bavarian type of man." (Radio Moscow 14.4.45.)

(2) The article "Demographic and Economic Changes in War-Time USSR" (April/May 1945) described the Bolshevik attempts to solve the national questions in the USSR by mass evacuations and stated that the time could be foreseen when none of the nationalities in the Soviet Union will any longer form a majority in their own areas, when Ukrainians will form a minority in the Ukraine, Kazakhs a minority in Kazakhstan. We can quite imagine that the Kremlin is thinking of a similar handling of the Germans. What finally remained of the German people would then be subjected to an appropriate ideological treatment.

#### THE NATIONAL QUESTION

If these should indeed be the plans of Moscow,

it would do well to bear in mind that not even the Ukrainian question could be solved by these methods. National questions can only be solved if the nations concerned agree to the solution. Stalin tried to get them to agree by offering them the formula that the peoples belonging to the Soviet Union should have "cultures national in form [particularly in language] and socialist in content." But even this did not solve the problem, and the struggle against "nationalistic deviations" among the ranks of the Party members themselves runs like a leading thread through the history of the Bolshevik Party. Even far behind the front, in the small Tartar and Bashkir Republics, nationalistic tendencies have recently been discovered again within the Party organizations there, so that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party in Moscow had to issue a decree against them. (*Bolshevik*, No. 19/20, 1944, p. 57 and *Propagandist*, No. 3, 1945, p. 16)

And what the Bolsheviks offer today is even less than Stalin's formula. It is one of the most interesting developments in the ideological sphere that this formula is at present also undergoing a change. *Bolshevik*, the interpreter of whatever happens to be the current Party line, writes in this connection:

The ideal development in the arts of our brother peoples is connected above all with the working out of new themes, images, problems. These are the problems of social progress, the images of a new man, the man of our time. *The new content naturally also requires a corresponding form* [italics ours]. One cannot regard the national form of art as immutably fixed once and for all—it develops, grows, changes its appearance in the same measure as its content is enriched and developed. Unfortunately this is not understood everywhere. There are attempts to perpetuate the national form of art as fixed for all times, not subject to change and development. (*Bolshevik*, No. 19/20, 1944, p. 55)

Translated from Bolshevik phraseology, this means that the culture of the peoples is to become Bolshevik not only in content but even in form. And it is well to remember: "The experience regarding the solution of the national question in the USSR possesses world-historical significance. . . . The future belongs to this solution." (*Bolshevik*, No. 2, 1945, p. 47)

If, however, even in the original formulation of Stalin and even when applied to peoples having belonged to Russia for centuries, the Bolshevik nationalities policy has had no success, what chances of success can it possibly have in the new formulation and toward peoples who have had their own great history and culture for thousands of years? And if the Bashkir Party members still have nationalistic tendencies in the twenty-seventh year of Bolshevik rule, what is to be expected of German, Italian, or other Party members outside of the USSR? Surely, it was addressed to them rather than to the Bashkirs when *Propagandist* wrote:

Our Party combines the Communist organizations of the Soviet republics, not as a federation of independent Communist parties, but as a single, centralized Party which comprises the advanced elements of the working class without distinction of nationality. (No. 3/4, 1945, p. 29)

#### TWO STAGES

All these considerations lead us to believe that the Communist parties outside of the USSR will in the near future not be allowed to follow the example of the Communist Party in Russia in the years after 1917 and independently to take charge of the affairs of their respective peoples. Instead, they will be ordered to act entirely under the guidance of Moscow and at the same time to free Moscow of all responsibility for these actions.

What will these actions be like? Little is known about those already carried out in the states that have fallen under the control of the Soviets. The Bolshevik press is sparing with information, and the Allied journalists have either no access at all or a very limited one. But the history of the Soviet Union and all that has been taught during the last few years in the numerous Party schools, Marxist-Leninist universities, and political courses in the USSR allow us more or less to foresee the measures planned. In the economic sphere they consist chiefly of the abolishment of private possession of means of production and the collectivization of agriculture. Whether industrialization is included depends on how the nation in question reacts toward Bolshevism. The more independent it shows itself to be in its thinking, the more cautious will the Bolsheviks be in furthering its industrialization. In the cultural sphere the measures will consist of permeating it with a Bolshevik content and adapting it to the Bolshevik form. To reduce it to a brief formula: nationalization of economics, denationalization of culture.

The situation is somewhat more complicated in the political sphere. There a sort of popular front will at first be inevitable in which the Communists of the country in question will join up with other democratic parties "on a democratic footing."

The participation of the Communists in the governments of other countries, particularly of those recently liberated from the German Fascists, such as Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and France, is an essential condition for the organization of the progressive elements of the country for the fight against Fascism and for the establishment of a true democracy. (Radio Khabarovsk, 6.2.45)

But those who are ready to accept a popular front of that kind must not overlook the fact that this only represents the first stage toward Bolshevization; concerning the second stage, the same broadcast said:

Lenin taught that after the first stage of revolution comes the next, the transition to social revolution, the fight for the socialist stage. . . . In order to gain the hegemony of the proletariat, it is necessary to isolate the *bourgeoisie* from the revolution. Then the pro-



letariat is the sole leading force of the revolution, it guarantees its correct development and its success.

But the Bolsheviks today know better than Lenin could once have known that the proletariat itself is also only an amorphous mass whose attitude is determined by its leaders. The German proletariat, for instance, which in 1932 still gave thirteen million Marxist (Communist and Social Democratic) votes at the Reichstag election, a few years later fought to the utmost under a government which had destroyed all Marxist organizations.

If, however, for reasons discussed above, Moscow cannot afford unqualifiedly to entrust the Communist parties of the countries concerned with the leadership of their proletariat and people, it needs an additional instrument, an instrument which is less likely to follow a political line of its own, independent of or even inopportune to Moscow. The Kremlin believes that it has found this instrument.

#### TRADE UNIONS

For the last year and a half, a growing interest on the part of Moscow in trade unions abroad has become noticeable. Soviet participation in the recent International Trade Union Congress in London, the frequent visits of Soviet trade-union representatives abroad and vice versa, and the sending of V. Kuznetsov, the chairman of the Central Trade Union Council of the USSR to San Francisco, have emphasized this. There were at least five reasons to induce Moscow to exploit the trade-union movement in the world to a greater degree.

(1) Being economic rather than political organs, the trade unions include a far greater proportion of the labor class in the various countries than the Communist parties.

(2) While the Communist parties throughout the world, particularly in England and America, are looked upon by the majority of people with suspicion as exponents of a foreign power, the trade unions, being national institutions, do not on the whole suffer from such odium.

(3) The Soviet trade unions can co-operate with the foreign ones without any ideological problems being raised as in the case of the Comintern.

(4) In large parts of Europe the Marxist trade unions abolished under German influence are being revived, which makes it easier for the Communists to penetrate into their leading positions than it was several years ago, when the existing unions with their old leaders would have little to do with the Communists.

(5) It would enhance Moscow's control over the Communist parties abroad if it could simultaneously exert an increasing control over the foreign trade unions.

The world is sufficiently acquainted with the nature of the trade unions in the USSR. Apart from social-welfare work for their mem-

bers, their chief duty, as the representatives of the state, is to persuade their members to work harder. They are organized not according to trades but according to the factory the workers belong to, a fact which emphasizes their lack of independence. The Soviet trade unions are organizations dependent on the employer, i.e., the state. The obligatory nature of the Bolshevik Party's leading and directing role in the trade unions is openly emphasized. (*Propagandist*, No.1, 1945, p.24)

As far as can be judged from the scanty material available, a similar trend is already making itself felt in the Eastern European countries dominated by the Soviets. There, too, the trade unions are beginning to be transformed into instruments of the state for the purpose of controlling the workers and driving them in the desired direction. The more the government authority in these territories resembles that of the Soviet Union, the more pronounced will this trend become.

A special role would devolve upon the trade unions in Germany:

The German Labor Front [the National Socialist Trade Union] must be liquidated completely and a democratic trade union movement created in Germany under the supervision of the international trade-union organization. The trade-union movement demands participation in ridding German literature, art, theater, etc., of the Fascist influence. (*Trud*, 18.2.45)

With these words, the organ of the Central Council of Trade Unions in the USSR announces the claim of non-German trade unions to supervising future German Marxist trade unions. This supervision is to be exerted directly from Moscow in those territories falling under Soviet control, and indirectly by means of the English, French, and American trade unions in the territories controlled by those countries.

#### WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

In the countries outside of the Soviet Union's sphere of domination, the situation is for the time being somewhat different. As long as Moscow demanded the greatest efforts on the part of its allies in the war against Germany, it was in its own interest to urge their trade unions loyally to support the governments allied to the Soviet Union.

It is only with the most active participation of the working class, the most active support on the part of the trade unions for the governments of the democratic countries, that Hitler-Germany can be quickly smashed. (V. Kuznetsov in *Voyna i Rabochy Klass*, No. 2, 1945, p. 3)

It goes without saying that Moscow will only urge the foreign trade unions to show loyalty to their respective governments as long as the latter are "truly democratic." But what is "truly democratic" and what not, will be decided in Moscow and propagated by its followers among the ranks of the foreign trade unions. So far the main prerequisite of "true

democracy" was anti-Fascism: war against Germany and friendship with the USSR. But Moscow could at any time take the stand that not only Fascism but also capitalism is irreconcilable with true democracy. For, in the eyes of the Bolsheviks, it is the dictatorship of the proletariat as embodied by the Soviet state, not the Western type of democratic government, which is the only true form of democracy. There are many indications that Moscow is apprehensive of the emergence of anti-Soviet (i.e., from its point of view: pro-Fascist) tendencies among its allies as soon as the war is ended in Europe. With the aid of the trade unions it is trying to counteract this development:

The workers' organizations must make use of their political influence and their weight for a determined stand against all remnants of the Munich policy [i.e., a foreign policy excluding the Soviets], against all those who sow dissension in the camp of the United Nations, against any attempt to disrupt the unity and the concerted action of the Allies. (*Voyna i Rabochy Klass*, No. 3, 1945, p. 2)

In order to avoid the repetition of former mistakes in the postwar period, the freedom-loving nations must not only completely destroy all sources of Fascism but also paralyze the activity of pro-Fascist elements in Allied and neutral countries. (*Bolshevik*, No. 22, 1944, p. 17.)

#### TUTELAGE AT HOME

We have examined the forces abroad on which the Bolsheviks can base their future foreign policy, and we must now ask: what are the domestic forces they can rely upon for it?

The readers of this magazine are acquainted with our previous articles in which we attempted to follow domestic developments in the USSR during the war and to look behind the impressive façade. They know that on the basis of Soviet material we have pointed out certain flaws in the Bolshevik fabric. Every month prolonging the war has emphasized our conclusions; indeed, the results of the victorious advance of the last year have made them particularly evident. We have never discussed the question whether these flaws will cause the Soviet Union to collapse or not, for we do not lay claim to the gift of prophecy. But here again we cannot ignore these flaws. In studying Soviet foreign policy, we must bear the following points in mind.

As long as the Bolsheviks believed that, as a result of man's dependence on matter and economics, the establishment of an economic order after Marx's recipe would automatically produce the Bolshevik type of man, they paid little attention to the inner life of their subjects. They left it to the Marxist laws of evolution to harmonize this inner life with the Bolshevik reality. In the thirties, they began to realize that human mentality does not by any means follow economic developments but remains static or changes quite autonomously.

All the more during the war, when millions of people were deeply stirred and, in addition, provided with weapons, were the Soviets forced to guide the emotions and ideas of these people before they could find their own expression and become dangerous to Bolshevism. Love of one's country, one's family, of the past history of one's nation—all these were proclaimed to be immanent elements of the Communist ideology and the Bolshevik type of man. The Bolsheviks have not spared efforts and psychological skill in their attempts to guide the most intimate mental stirrings of their subjects. At present, for instance, the Party is doing its utmost to cast the mental reactions caused by the crossing of the Soviet border in millions of Soviet citizens into a form agreeable to the Bolsheviks.

If, however, men and women, children and old people, high officials, professors, and ordinary laborers, must be ceaselessly enlightened and driven ideologically, if the economic system can only function with the aid of millions of agitators (see "Behind Soviet Production," November 1944), then one can hardly speak of a spiritual unity between the state and its oligarchy on the one hand and the people on the other. At any rate, there is no other state in the world which has seen itself compelled to exert such a gigantic, incessant, and unique tutelage upon its own population.

From this follows that the Bolsheviks can neither rely on the spontaneous collaboration of wide circles of their own population in their foreign policy nor confidently send these people to Europe and expose them to the influence of the outer world. Between the desire politically to exploit the military successes as rapidly as possible and the necessity of continuing and, if possible, completing the process of educating the masses by their extended isolation, there is a contradiction, the solving of which represents a serious problem for the Bolsheviks.

What we have said about the masses of the population is true also, although to a lesser extent, of the Party members. They, too, have been subjected to an intensive process of education (see "The End of Soviet Isolation," December 1944). They, too, are not left to themselves but are constantly being given new, binding instructions which frequently contradict each other. Now they are to sing the *International*, now the new Russian national anthem; now they are to behave like true Russians, now as internationalists; to recognize the Church and to combat religious feelings; to attack tendencies toward private property and to promote them by piece-work wages. No wonder that there are very few who are able to find their own way through this maze, and that the majority must be guided day by day through all these contradictory instructions.

The further the Red Army has advanced in Europe, the more openly has the Soviet press

expressed its anxiety over the reliability of the majority of Party members. The theme that people who have in one way or another come into contact with the Germans have been contaminated by them and filled with anti-Bolshevist, pro-private property, and nationalistic ideas, and that the stay abroad has serious ideological consequences, appears in countless variations. One is also struck by the new emphasis on the party statutes, which have not been mentioned for many years. This underlining of the disciplinary duties of all Party members can hardly be explained except by a certain crisis within the Party.

It is true that the Party leaders can count with more or less certainty on the almost six million members agreeing to whatever the Party does in its foreign policy. But the Party needs more than consent. It needs the participation, the active personal support, of its members if it wants to succeed in its foreign policy. Since constant supervision and issuing of instructions is very difficult abroad, the Party is trying to bring back its utterly confused members to the orthodox principles of Leninism. Hence the unusual attention being devoted by the countless Party schools again in recent times to Lenin's chief publications. Hence also the emphasis in press, radio, and political meetings on the fact that the assertion of a change in Bolshevism is nonsense.

It is open to doubt whether the flagrant contradiction between the variability of Bolshevist policy and the stressed immutability of

Bolshevist ideology can be bridged by such means.

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This much can at least be said already: in comparison to the primitive but—by virtue of its consistent and radical nature—infectious procedure of the Bolsheviks at the end of the first World War, they have lost much of their impetus today. While in 1917 and 1918 victorious German divisions on the eastern front succumbed to Bolshevik ideas and brought red flags to Berlin, the Bolsheviks had now to overwhelm every single German with their tanks before they could raise the Hammer and Sickle over Berlin. The Party leaders as well as the Party members as a whole are far more aware of the negative significance of this fact than are the foreign countries which are fascinated by the victorious march of the Red Army. The Bolsheviks know that the greatness of their military victory only serves to emphasize the greatness of their ideological defeat.

Paying due consideration to the shrewdness and far-sightedness of the Bolsheviks, we must not overlook the problematical nature of their domestic conditions and the difficulties of their foreign situation in judging the possibilities of a Bolshevik offensive in Europe. And finally we must not entirely disregard the sound instincts of the people of Europe and the anti-Bolshevist attitude of the Anglo-Saxon nations.

### *Lucious License*

In Springfield, Ill., State officials, proud of having saved tons of steel by making 1945 Illinois automobile licenses out of a soybean plastic, were chagrined when motorists began complaining that hungry dogs now chase their cars for blocks to get a bite of the tasty new plates.

### *Antibaptist*

In San Juan Capistrano, Calif., the *Coastline Dispatch* ran an advertisement: "Notice. Positively no more baptizing in my pasture. Twice here in the last two months my gate has been left open by Christian people and before I chase my heifers all over the country again, all sinners can go to hell."

### *Bare Fact*

In Los Angeles, assorted employees at the Follies Theater, charged with contributing to juvenile delinquency by acting in an allegedly nude show, asked dismissal of charges on the ground that a woman is not naked so long as she has her shoes on.

### *Cooler Sweaters*

In Pittsburgh, a matron sent sweaters for the native girls living on the Pacific island where her husband was stationed, was horrified to hear that the girls had made them cooler by cutting two big holes in the front.

### *Initial Investment*

In San Diego, Petros Protopapadakis made application to change his name to Petros FDR Protopapadakis.